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Muslims in the UK and Europe • I



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978-0-9573166-1-4



Patterns of British Government Engagements with Muslim Faith-based Organizations: The Second Image Reversed?

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Abstract

Over the course of the last 25 years, there has been considerable variation in how successive British governments have engaged with Muslim faith-based NGOs at the national level. The primary research question examined in this chapter is how to best account for the longitudinal pulsing between more corporatist and more pluralist patterns of engagement between successive governments and Muslim faith-based NGOs in Britain. This paper argues that overall changes in patterns of engagement along a corporatist-pluralist continuum under successive governments since the late-1980s can be most consistently explained by the effects of international political events and short-term security imperatives, rather than concerns for maintaining community and social cohesion.

Introduction

Over the course of the last 25 years, there has been considerable variation in how successive British governments have engaged with Muslim faith-based NGOs at the national level.¹ In plotting changing patterns of engagement or interest intermediation over time, Schmitter (1974) provides two ideal conceptual types, namely *pluralist* and *corporatist* patterns of engagement, at either ends of a continuum that can be used to measure changes in how states engage with civil society actors over time. Schmitter's conceptualization of a corporatist-pluralist dimension provides specific and measurable tangible properties that systematize the concepts of *corporatism* and *pluralism* (See Table 1).² The primary research question examined in this paper is how to best account for the longitudinal pulsing between more corporatist and more pluralist patterns of engagement between the state and Muslim faith-based NGOs in Britain over the past 25 years.

Table 1: *The corporatist-pluralist dimension*

Measure / Dimension	More Corporatist	More pluralist
No of interest groups	Limited number	Unspecified number
Within a given issue area	Singular	Multiple
Formation	Compulsory	Voluntary
Status	Non-Competitive	Competitive
Structure	Hierarchical	Non-hierarchical
Function	Functionally differentiated	Non-determined
State	Recognizes or licenses	Does not recognize or license
State	Grants a monopoly	Does not grant a monopoly

Source: Adapted from Philippe Schmitter, “Still the Century of Corporatism?” *The Review of Politics* 36, no. 1 (January 1974): 85–131.

Variation over Time in Engagement between the State and Faith-based NGOs

Developments in recent years have marked a departure from Britain’s long-standing tradition of the *quasi-corporatist* structuring of engagement with minority faith-based NGOs. In other words, generally speaking, the British state has tended to favour engagement with a single voluntarily formed interlocutor and has traditionally demonstrated a willingness to amend its institutions—albeit in a somewhat cautious and gradualist manner—in response to specific demands for the accommodation of the needs of minority faith communities as expressed by its privileged interlocutor.³ Historically, privileged faith-based NGOs can point to having exerted considerable influence on domestic legislation as well as British foreign policy.⁴ For example, archival research confirms the more pluralist origins and structuring of interest intermediation between the British state and the Board of Deputies of British Jews. British governments have demonstrated a relatively consistent willingness to accommodate the religious needs of Britain’s Jewish communities, such as the incorporation in various Acts of Parliament of Sunday trading exceptions,⁵ certification of Jewish marriage registrars⁶ and legislative provisions made for *Shechita* (ritual slaughter),⁷ in the face of concerted lobbying efforts by the Board of Deputies. Moreover, day-to-day interactions between the Board of Deputies and the governments of the day over issues such as the plight of co-religionists in foreign lands indicates long-standing stability in patterns of engagement between Jewish faith-based NGOs and the state.

However, the patterns of engagement of successive British governments with Muslim faith-based NGOs have exhibited ‘pulsing’ between more corporatist and more pluralist forms of intermediation over the last 25 years (See Table 2). This pulsing undermines the argument that policy responses can be reliably predicted by national institutional models.⁸ Moreover, this pulsing appears to have occurred relatively independently of transfers of power between political parties, although changes in government and ministerial level personnel, particularly those at the Department of Communities and Local Government, the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, have undoubtedly resulted in the redefining of policy and budgetary priorities and changes in terms of with whom—and at what level (i.e. primarily national or local)—successive governments engage with Muslim civil society organizations.⁹

Pulsing in British Governments’ Relations with Muslim Faith-based NGOs

The late 1980s are chosen here as a starting point for this analysis because of a consensus among interviewees across the spectrum, as well as in the secondary literature, on the importance of the Satanic Verses Affair as a critical juncture in the history of the British state’s engagement with Muslim faith-based NGOs. Moreover, both primary and secondary sources indicate broad agreement on a *reactive sequence* that led from the aftermath of the internationalization of the Satanic Verses Affair in the late 1980s to the formation of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) in 1997.¹⁰

Table 2: *Changing patterns of engagement between government and Muslim faith-based NGOs*

Timeframe	Critical Juncture	Change in Pattern of Engagement	Change in government Partners
1994-2001	The Satanic Verses Affair	<i>ad hoc pluralist to quasi corporatist</i>	The MCB as a 'privileged interlocutor'
2001-2005	Global War on Terror	<i>quasi corporatist to disengagement</i>	New Labour - MCB relationship in decline New Labour searches for alternative interlocutors
2005-present	July 7th 2005 attacks	<i>co-opted pluralist to diminished co-opted pluralist</i>	De novo creation of interlocutors (e.g. Sufi Muslim Council) Provision of significant financial and/or political support to existing orgs. (e.g. British Muslim Forum / QuilliamFoundation) Founding of MINAB (2006)

In 1994, faced with a multiplicity of interlocutors, with more than one organization claiming to be the legitimate representative of Britain’s Muslim Communities, Conservative Home Secretary John Howard suggested—or demanded—that Muslim faith-based NGOs collaborate to provide better representation and, ultimately, present a unified interlocutor to government. Brighton (2007) and Mandaville (2001) also point to a struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran at this juncture for influence over nascent lobby groups as one explanation for divisiveness among civil society actors at this time (although it is important to note that foreign support for these organizations should be taken as evidence of initial mutual sympathy and common interests rather than demonstrative of a principal-agent relationship).¹¹

While Howard’s role in this meeting has been variously described as a “demand”¹² or a “helpful suggestion”¹³ for the provision of a single interlocutor, it ultimately implied that the extension of state recognition would follow the formation of a body that could act as a surrogate representative of Britain’s Muslim communities. This *quasi-corporatist* structuring of interest intermediation was congruent with historical arrangements whereby the Board of Deputies was privileged as a surrogate representative of Anglo-Jewry.¹⁴ This seminal meeting prompted a consultation process led by a

number of like-minded Muslim faith-based NGOs—primarily Islamist legacy groups—under the aegis of the National Interim Committee on Muslim Affairs, to investigate the possibilities for promoting unity amongst various organizations with proximate mutual interests. These consultations ultimately led to the founding of the Muslim Council of Britain in November 1997.

For several years after its formation, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) enjoyed a honeymoon period in its relationship with the New Labour government. New Labour's presentation of the MCB as "authentic representatives of British Muslims", the use of funding mechanisms to "force independent Muslim bodies to deal with [the MCB]," and the government's instrumental use of the MCB as a proxy for British Muslim opinion further indicates the neo-corporatism inherent in New Labour's engagement strategy at that time.¹⁵ Though technically independent of state control, the MCB came to be pejoratively characterized by some as New Labour's "pet project," "favorite Muslim umbrella organization" and even as "lassi Islamists" because of its perceived proximity to government.¹⁶

It is important not to over-emphasize the role of the MCB as the sole interlocutor for British Muslim communities with New Labour between 1997 and 2001. That is, it is clear that the state was engaging with other Muslim faith-based NGOs at the national-level during this period, although the MCB is widely regarded to have held an especially privileged position. The al-Khoei Foundation, for example, had since 1992 been engaging, in a more understated way, with various government departments at various levels, over issues of particular concern to Britain's Shia communities not represented under the MCB umbrella or by its predecessor organizations.¹⁷

Over time, however, the MCB's organizational structure undoubtedly hampered its effectiveness as it attempted to walk a tightrope between representing a plethora of constituent organizations, while continuing to curry favor with—and maintaining access to—its governmental interlocutors. As an umbrella group that claims to represent several hundred affiliated national, regional and local organizations, mosques, charities and schools, the MCB has also been primarily dependent on volunteers for its staffing needs with a very thin professional executive layer sitting atop this unwieldy umbrella structure. These organizational and structural realities have complicated internal bargaining processes between the MCB's executive and its affiliates and has undoubtedly encumbered its ability to respond decisively

when faced with crisis situations in its engagements with the state. While the MCB's constituency is broad in organizational-structural terms, it has been widely critiqued as being insufficiently inclusive in its representation of the diversity of British Muslims. While the cumbersome nature of dealing with such a large number of affiliated groups has complicated the MCB's engagement with government, the fact that certain sectarian demographics were not well-represented—or represented at all—under the MCB umbrella has made it vulnerable to criticism about its credibility and legitimacy as a representative of British Muslims writ large.

By the early 2000s, New Labour was becoming increasingly disillusioned with the MCB. By this time, the limitations of the MCB as a civil society partner—first expressed in British Muslim media outlets such as *Q News* and later by mainstream broadsheets—were also percolating through government. Central to this disillusionment was the Blair government's adamant rejection of the existence of a causal link between British foreign policy in the context of the 'Global War on Terror' and domestic radicalization.¹⁸ Various interviewees, from across political and sectarian divides, identify the aftermath of 9/11 and the run up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as critical junctures that marked the beginning of a souring relationship between the government and the MCB.¹⁹ Again, a reactive sequence can be identified to explain the reasons behind this growing disillusionment. First, the MCB's public statement on October 9th, 2001 expressing its grave reservations over the impending attacks on Afghanistan infuriated Tony Blair who had engaged in a concerted effort to persuade community leaders to "sell" the American-led bombing campaign.²⁰ The second reason mentioned by interviewees involves a meeting between Prime Minister Tony Blair and representatives of various Muslim faith-based NGOs at 10 Downing Street in late 2002 during which Blair sought to garner support for (or at least mitigate opposition to) the impending invasion of Iraq but was ultimately rebuffed by the MCB and its affiliated groups.²¹

Finally, in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the emergence of a political nexus between MCB-affiliated activists (particularly from the Muslim Association of Britain) and various groups on the political left, in the form of the Stop the War Coalition, crossed a 'red line' of sorts in that it presented a direct political challenge to New Labour from groups that it, ordinarily, would have considered part of its natural constituency.²² What is most significant here is that it was New Labour's short-term foreign policy

considerations—rather than concerns over social cohesion and/or ‘representativeness’—that appear to have provided the impulse for its initial disengagement with the MCB and, ultimately, a shift from a *quasi-corporatist* to a *co-opted pluralist* form of engagement.

Certainly, the various government departments directly involved in engaging with the MCB were aware from an early stage of its limitations as an interlocutor. Primary among these limitations was the MCB’s lack of representativeness (especially a lack of Sufi representation that also made it weak in urban areas in the north of England). Furthermore, the MCB’s perceived proximity to transnational networks (in particular the Jama’at-e-Islami and, to a lesser extent, the Muslim Brotherhood) made it vulnerable to the political and media polemics that tend to swirl around these organizations, despite the fact that the MCB’s domestic political pragmatism demonstrated a divergence from the ideologies of the transnational Islamist organizations with which it has often been identified.²³

In the short-term, the MCB’s instrumental political utility as a partner for New Labour had trumped these concerns. However, as the MCB began to come into conflict with New Labour over foreign policy issues—particularly over the Blair government’s untenable insistence that there was no causal link between British foreign policy and domestic violent extremism—political and media critiques started to hone in on the MCB’s illiberal positions on issues such as homosexuality and arranged marriages, as well as its controversial position of not participating in Holocaust Memorial Day. While the Blair government continued to engage with the MCB between 2002 and 2008, the MCB had undoubtedly lost its privileged status as an interlocutor with the MCB leadership, as one interviewee put it, “still in the room but not listened to.”²⁴

The July 7th, 2005 attacks in London are widely regarded by interviewees as constituting another ‘critical juncture’ in relations between the state and Muslim faith-based NGOs. While New Labour was already attempting to locate alternative interlocutors to the MCB by this point in time, the attacks changed the tenor, scope, and urgency of this process. Substantial funding was soon made available for a wide variety of projects to prevent violent extremism under the aegis of the PREVENT program. The dangling carrot of government funding attracted a plethora of social entrepreneurs who

competed for core funding for their organizations or project funding for specific initiatives. While some Muslim faith-based NGOs jumped enthusiastically into this fray, many expressed concern over the tenor and scope of the government's PREVENT agenda and the potential for its singular focus on Britain's Muslim communities to exacerbate stigmatization and marginalization. Others raised concerns with the surveillance aspects of the PREVENT program and that state funding under PREVENT came with many objectionable strings attached.²⁵

A Shift to State Engineered Plurality

Subsequent to the 7/7 attacks and prior to its disengagement from the MCB in 2009,²⁶ New Labour had already embarked on a process of engineering its own set of interlocutors, either through the provision of substantial political and/or financial support to new start-ups (e.g. The Quilliam Foundation, the Sufi Muslim Council, CENTRI) or by bringing pre-existing Muslim faith-based NGOs into the funding fold (e.g. the primarily Sufi-oriented umbrella group, the British Muslim Forum [BMF]).²⁷ This heralded a new engagement strategy of *co-opted pluralism*. At this juncture, funding choices appear to have been primarily driven by a counter-extremist imperative (e.g. The Quilliam Foundation, CENTRI) and/or an impetus to engineer 'liberal foils' to the MCB by providing political and financial support to faith-based NGOs that were not considered adequately represented by the MCB (e.g. the Sufi Muslim Council and the BMF).

These changes in engagement strategy resulted in the emergence of a new cast of professionalized social entrepreneurs and a faith-based NGO landscape that one interviewee characterized as producers in a government-run "market of ideas",²⁸ with organizations that pitched initiatives that most closely aligned with the PREVENT agenda and the short-term political and security urgencies of the government being those that succeeded in the 'market' (of receiving government funding).²⁹ Many of these newer start-up organizations were even more disconnected from grassroots constituencies than the MCB's executive, from its hundreds of affiliated groups' constituencies. Moreover, many did not even claim to represent a constituency per se with the strategic focus of this new cast of faith-based NGOs tending to focus on specific issue-areas, rather than community representation.

For example, as a think-tank, the Quilliam Foundation is primarily focused on counter-extremist initiatives and sees policymakers as its primary constituency.³⁰ As Quilliam's agenda aligned well with that of government in a post-7/7 environment, it was the recipient of significant financial support from various government departments in its early years of operation. However, given the level of funding it received from government, its singular focus on counter-extremism, its adherence to a problematic 'conveyor-belt' theory of radicalization³¹, and its public criticism of other Muslim faith-based NGOs, Quilliam soon came to be seen by many as complicit in exacerbating the stigmatization and marginalization of Britain's Muslim communities.

Moreover, New Labour moved at this juncture to depoliticize the more politically active Muslim faith-based NGOs. The creation of the Mosques and Imams Advisory Board (MINAB) in 2006 was an initiative effectively midwived by the Home Office that brought together the MCB, the Brotherhood-affiliated Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), the Sufi-dominated BMF, and the Shia-dominated al-Khoei Foundation as affiliates under a single umbrella organization that was tasked with setting standards for mosques and imams throughout Britain.³² MINAB brought together the primary actors that were seen to be broadly representative of the sectarian spectrum of British Muslims. However, the inclusion of the MAB and al-Khoei Foundation (neither of which are mosque organizations) raised eyebrows and has led some to posit that the ultimate aim was to "contain Muslim identity politics and redirect Islamism into pastoral provision."³³

As the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition came to power after the 2010 elections, the pattern of engagement of *co-opted pluralism* that emerged under New Labour post-7/7 was largely retained. However, a number of significant changes occurred, including a shift to a more localized and individualized approach to engagement,³⁴ overall budget cutbacks and a significantly more cautious engagement strategy, particularly with regard to organizations perceived as having an Islamist agenda. Overall, interviewees report a significant reduction in the frequency and scope of engagements across the board with the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government, which some attribute to a lack of political will within the coalition for navigating the intricacies of faith-based engagement.³⁵

Conclusion

Changes in patterns of engagement along a corporatist-pluralist continuum since the late-1980s can be most consistently explained by external politics. From the governmental standpoint, the initial shift from a *ad hoc pluralist* to a *quasi-corporatist* pattern of engagement appears to have been motivated by frustration over the lack of collaboration between multiple interlocutors claiming to represent British Muslims in the years that followed the furor that followed the Satanic Verses Affair, a controversy that was internationalized when Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa calling for the killing of author Salman Rushdie. Some of the ensuing inter-organizational conflict between faith-based NGOs was likely driven by competition between first generation leaderships. Secondary sources point to Saudi Arabian and Iranian funding of lobby groups with initial mutual interests as having exacerbated the divisiveness.³⁶

The midwifing of the MCB, by successive Conservative and New Labour governments, resulted in a shift from the *ad hoc pluralist* to the *quasi-corporatist* structuring of interest intermediation following in the mold of the Board of Deputies. The shift away from the *quasi-corporatist* organization of state-faith-based NGO relations with the deterioration of the relationship between New Labour and the MCB appears to have been motivated by processes of government learning that highlighted the MCB's limitations as a civil society partner in a post-7/7 context. It is argued here that these limitations were sublimated as long as the MCB continued to be an instrumentally useful partner. Again, it appears to have largely been issues of external politics—especially surrounding disagreements between the MCB and New Labour over British participation in the Global War on Terror as well as over the existence of a causal link between foreign policy and domestic violent extremism—that motivated the shift away from the government's existing *quasi-corporatist* arrangement with the MCB.

The subsequent shift toward a more pluralist—or *co-opted pluralist*—pattern appears to have been driven by a desire to locate more inclusive and/or 'liberal' alternatives to the MCB whose remit aligned more closely with a post-7/7 counter-extremism imperative. In order to achieve these ends, the state made political and financial support available to a plethora of faith-based NGOs who were seen as either more amenable to counter-extremism imperatives

(e.g. Quilliam Foundation) and/or were under-represented by the MCB (e.g. the Sufi-dominated SMC and BMF). This pattern of *co-opted pluralism* has largely continued under the Conservative-Liberal Democratic Coalition, albeit in a more localized, individualized, and far less monetized fashion. A lack of political will and shrinking budgets translates into a harsher environment for Muslim faith-based NGOs with a ‘representative’ claim, although this perceived distance from government may well serve to buttress the legitimacy and credibility of such organizations. The question then becomes one of whether under-resourced Muslim faith-based NGOs operating at the national level can sink or swim—or maintain any relevance—in a new environment that is short on both governmental access and funding under a government whose engagement agenda is explicitly ‘localist.’

Notes

¹ The designation ‘faith-based NGOs’ is used here to indicate non-governmental organizations that deploy a ‘Muslim’ identity category in order to make collective claims on behalf of British Muslims and/or engage in lobbying vis-à-vis the state. See Fiona B. Adamson, “Engaging or Contesting the Liberal State? ‘Muslim’ as a Politicized Identity Category in Europe.” in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 37, no. 6 (July 2011): 899–915.

² Adapted from Philippe Schmitter, “Still the Century of Corporatism?” in *The Review of Politics* 36, no. 1 (January 1974): 85–131. In using this conceptual framework, it is important to note two caveats; first, “corporatism” and “pluralism,” as they are used here, are ideal types at either end of a conceptual dimension that are used here simply to measure variations in patterns of engagement over time. There is no suggestion that corporatist or pluralist patterns are themselves a cause or effect and no value judgment is made on the desirability or not of shifts toward more corporatist or more pluralist forms of intermediation. Second, it is necessary to note that, in reality, all state-society interactions include some mix of corporatist and pluralist structures and that the conceptual framework employed here is only intended to indicate broad trends along a continuum rather than shifts between an imaginary corporatist-pluralist dichotomy.

³ Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper, *Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany*. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).

⁴ Raphael Langham, *250 Years of Convention and Contention: A History of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1760-2010*. (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2010).

⁵ Board of Deputies of British Jews (BDBJ) Archival Reference C/13/5/3; BDBJ E/3/82; BDBJ C/13/3/7/29. The Board of Deputies archive is held at the London Metropolitan Archives.

⁶ See Raphael Langham, *250 Years of Convention and Contention: A History of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1760-2010*. (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2010) for a discussion of the Board of Deputies’ lobbying efforts vis-à-vis various Marriage Acts in the nineteenth century.

⁷ Board of Deputies of British Jews (BDBJ) Archival Reference C/16/34; BDBJ E/2/139; BDBJ E/3/55; BDBJ E/3/60. The Board of Deputies archive is held at the London Metropolitan Archives.

⁸ Michael Minkenberg, “The Policy Impact of Church-State Relations: Family Policy and Abortion in Britain, France, and Germany,” in *West European Politics*, 26, no. 1 (2003): 195–217.

⁸ Of course, an apparent *lack of correlation* does not necessarily imply that there is *no causation*.

¹⁰ Reactive sequences “are chains of temporally ordered and causally connected events.” See James Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” in *Theory and Society*, 29, no. 4 (2000): 507–48. For sources that specify a reactive sequence leading from the Satanic Verses Affair and the formation of the MCB, see Dilwar Hussain, “Muslim Political Participation in Britain and the ‘Europeanisation’ of Fiqh,” in *Die Welt Des Islams* 44, no. 3 (2004): 376–401 and Toby Archer, “Welcome to the Umma: The British State and Its Muslim Citizens Since 9/11,” in *Cooperation and Conflict* 44, no. 3 (September 2009): 329–47.

¹¹ See Shane Brighton, “British Muslims, Multiculturalism and UK Foreign Policy: ‘Integration’ and ‘Cohesion’ in and beyond the State,” in *International Affairs* 83, no. 1 (January 2007): 1–17; and Peter Mandaville, *Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma*, (London: Routledge, 2001):128.

¹² Steven Vertovec, “Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain,” in *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens*, ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002):19–35, and Munira Mirza, Zein Ja’far Abi Senthilkumaran, and Policy Exchange (Firm), *Living Apart Together: British Muslims and the Paradox of Multiculturalism*. (London: Policy Exchange, 2007).

¹³ Personal interview with Mustafa Field MBE from the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) on February 21, 2014. See also Humayun Ansari, *The Infidel Within: Muslims in Britain since 1800*. (London: Hurst and Co., 2004) and Max Farrar, ed. *Islam in the West: Key Issues in Multiculturalism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

¹⁴ Schmitter “Still the Century of Corporatism?”

¹⁵ Kenan Malik, *From Fatwa to Jihad: The Rushdie Affair and Its Legacy* (London: Atlantic, 2010).

¹⁶ See Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Tyler Golson, “Overhauling Islam: Representation, Construction, and Cooption of ‘Moderate Islam’ in Western Europe,” in *Journal of Church and State* 49, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 487–515; Jeevan Vasagar, “Dilemma of the Moderates.” *The Guardian*. June 19, 2002, sec. UK News. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2002/jun/19/september11.religion1>; and McLoughlin, Seán, “The State, New Muslim Leaderships and Islam as a Resource for Public Engagement in Britain,” in *European Muslims and the Secular State*, eds. Jocelyne Cesari and Sean McLoughlin. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005)

¹⁷ Personal interview with Yousif Al-Khoei of the al-Khoei Foundation on June 6, 2014.

¹⁸ Toby Greene, *Blair, Labour, and Palestine: Conflicting Views on Middle East Peace After 9/11*, (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013). David Miliband, as Foreign Secretary under Gordon Brown, moved toward a tacit recognition of the link between foreign policy and radicalization. See David Miliband, “New Diplomacy: Challenges for Foreign Policy,” Speech presented at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, July 19, 2007.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1557892/Full-text-of-Foreign-Secretarys-policy-speech.html>.

¹⁹ Personal interviews with Dr. Anas al-Tikriti of the Cordoba Foundation on February 18, 2014, and Mustafa Field MBE of the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) on February 21, 2014.

²⁰ Tahir Abbas characterizes this as, “the beginning of the end for MCB’s cozy relationship with No. 10.” The idea of the MCB’s opposition to the Afghan bombing campaign as a critical juncture was shared by a number of interviewees from across ideological and sectarian divides. See *Muslim Britain: Communities under Pressure*, ed. Tahir Abbas (London New York: Zed Books, 2005). For more about the ‘selling’ of coalition attacks on Afghanistan, see Jonathan Birt, “Lobbying and Marching: British Muslims and the State.” in *Muslim Britain: Communities under Pressure*, ed. Tahir Abbas (London New York: Zed Books, 2005)

²¹ Again, there is some variation between interviewees as to the characterization of this meeting with, for example, one interviewee characterizing the meeting as an attempt by Blair to “measure the degree of support or opposition” of Muslim community leaders with another characterizing it as a more forceful “demand for support.”

²² Personal interview with Dr. Anas al-Tikriti of the Cordoba Foundation on February 18, 2014.

²³ Jonathan Birt, “Lobbying and Marching: British Muslims and the State.” in *Muslim Britain: Communities under Pressure*, ed. Tahir Abbas (London New York: Zed Books, 2005)

²⁴ Personal interview with Mustafa Field MBE of the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board on February 21, 2014.

²⁵ Personal interview with Tehmina Kazi of British Muslims for Secular Democracy on May 22, 2014.

²⁶ In 2009, the response of former British Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, Hazel Blears, in attempting to force the resignation of Daud Abdullah, Deputy Secretary General of the Muslim Council of Britain, was indicative of an unprecedented level of government interference in the operation of a supposedly independent and non-governmental body. Such maneuvering can be seen as an attempt to impose controls on the selection of leaders of a civil society organization—a hallmark of more corporatist patterns of interest intermediation. However, it has also been suggested that the Daud Abdullah affair simply provided New Labour with a convenient excuse to make a definitive public break with the MCB.

²⁷ Personal interview with Mustafa Field MBE of MINAB on February 21, 2014.

²⁸ Personal interview with Dr. Usama Hasan of the Quilliam Foundation on February 19, 2014.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ See, Pankhurst, Reza. 2015. “Woolwich, ‘Islamism’ and the ‘Conveyor Belt to Terrorism’ Theory | Hurst Publishers.” *HURST*. Accessed March 30. <http://www.hurstpublishers.com/woolwich-islamism-and-the-conveyor-belt-to-terrorism-theory/>.

³² The Shia representation in MINAB was a collaborative effort between the al-Khoei Foundation, the World Federation of Khoja Shia and the Pakistani Shia community.

³³ Birt, Yahya. "Governing Muslims after 9/11." In *Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives*, edited by S. Sayyid and A.K. Vakil, 117–28. (London: Hurst, 2008).

³⁴ For a much more detailed discussion of continuity and change in faith engagement between New Labour and the Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition, see Therese O'Toole, "Faith and the Coalition: A New Confidence to 'Do God'?" in *Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance Working Paper*, No. 3.

³⁵ Interviews with Tehmina Kazi of British Muslims for Secular Democracy and Dr. Usama Hasan of the Quilliam Foundation.

³⁶ Brighton, "British Muslims, Multiculturalism and UK Foreign Policy" and Mandaville, *Transnational Muslim Politics*.